The (old) Licquia Family Blog

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Sun, 11 May 2003

More on (a)theism

Don Sensing posted an answer of sorts to Den Beste's atheism post. His response is quick, and hints at a potential future post. Let me add my voice to the list of those who would be interested in a follow-up.

In a comment, an atheist invoked Occam's Razor as a principle that supposedly dictates that atheism is the most logical position to hold. (This seems to be a common thing to do.) I answered the comment briefly there, but felt the need to elaborate.

Occam's Razor works best with well-understood areas that have a couple of unclear spots. It's also good at pointing the way to further research. But when the whole field is a mystery, Occam is a very poor guide. Consider that the theory of relativity would have been rejected under this criteria in Newtonian England, even though it turns out to be more correct.

Atheism is a statement about what is not. It is nonscientific in that it doesn't really explain anything or give us any predictive power. Thus, it doesn't really suffice as an alternative to theism in an Occamist sense. And there are many questions religious theism answers that science cannot or has not, making science a poor Occamist alternative as well. Atheists are therefore relegated to admitting their lack of knowledge on a whole host of issues. This may or may not be a valid belief to have, but Occam is not going to be able to tell you one way or the other.

>From the comment on Sensing's post:

We know that no disproof of God's existence can be logically derived, but choose instead to believe that as long as the observable Universe behaves as if God does not exist then it is the most rational stance to be an atheist.

This, too, isn't clearly true. The question Popper would ask: What does it mean for the Universe to behave as if God does exist?

The hallmark of "mechanistic atheism" is the observation that the universe appears to be self-motivated; in other words, it doesn't look like someone outside of the universe is propping it up. How would we know, though? Obviously, only if the prop wasn't doing a good job, and the rules governing the universe seemed to fail every so often in a way we couldn't explain or predict. I don't know about you, but I wouldn't want to live in such a capricious universe, to say nothing of the probability that I wouldn't likely exist to have a choice in the matter.

Since consistency in the universe's operation seems to be a prerequisite for sentient life, mechanistic atheism is a bit of a tautology. If we couldn't exist without a consistent universe, then requiring an inconsistent universe as a proof of anything automatically disqualifies that belief. Put another way: we can't rightly hold God hostage by our need for consistency on his part, then insist that he be inconsistent before we believe in him. Doing so would essentially amount to suicide: we would behold God's face and die.

Of course, God could interfere in the rules in small ways, ways that were generally positive and non-disruptive. Out of necessity, such interventions would be rare and non-reproducible. Reports of such interventions would be dismissed as anecdotes by anyone who wasn't a direct observer. Thus, as proof, such interventions would only work on a personal level, and not as an effective tool in general discourse.

Surprisingly, the world as it really is seems to resemble this hypothetical world quite closely.

This isn't a proof, any more than anything else discussed so far is a proof. But it does put the lie to atheistic arrogance regarding being "more rational". Den Beste is right: the question of God is rightfully a matter of faith on all sides.

May 11, 2003 | Comments are no longer available